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HIDDEN INEQUALITY: 
HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE WOULD ADJUSTMENT FOR ILLICIT FINANCIAL 
FLOWS MAKE TO NATIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS?  
 
 
Abstract: A recent innovation in measuring inequality is the incorporation of adjustments to 
top incomes using data from tax authorities, revealing higher inequality. The thesis of this 
paper is that the incorporation of estimates of income from illicit financial flows, reflecting 
untaxed capital, may be as significant to national inequality - but with greater variation across 
countries. We propose a method of adjusting national inequality data for illicit flows, and 
present preliminary results. These estimates suggest that untaxed illicit flows could be as 
important as (taxed) top incomes to estimates of inequality – highlighting the importance of 
improving estimates of underlying illicit flows.  
 
Keywords: income inequality, tax, illicit financial flows, income distribution 
JEL: D31, H26 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his 1954 presidential address to the American Economic Association, ‘Economic growth 
and income inequality’, Simon Kuznets (1955, p.1) noted the “unusual scarcity of data” 
plaguing this field of study. He went on to lay out five specifications of data that would be 
valuable, but noted that it began “to look like a statistical economist’s pipe dream” (p.2). In 
recent years, that pipe dream has begun to look rather more like an achievable aim – but 
important problems remain. These form a critical part of the broader problem of uncounted 
inequality (Cobham, 2015), in which marginalized groups tend to be further excluded by their 
omission from surveys and other policy-sensitive data collation, while elites are able to exert 
and extend their power by excluding themselves from data collation processes that might give 
rise to policy implications – such as the taxation of offshore incomes.  
While this ‘uncounted’ extends to all aspects of human development, this paper 
focuses on income in particular. At the bottom of the distribution, Carr-Hill (2013) argues 
that there are systematic omissions from survey data, estimated to extend potentially to some 
250 million people worldwide or 3.5% of the world population. This is perhaps a small 
enough proportion that if it were spread evenly across the distribution it need not be a major 
cause for concern; but the groups in question are likely to be overwhelmingly those at the 
bottom end of national income distributions.  
At the top end of the distribution in household surveys, meanwhile, there is the well-
known evidence of non-response from high-income groups. Korinek et al. (2005) survey a 
range of literature on overall non-response, showing it to be often as high as 30%. For US 
data, their model implies that upward corrections of the Gini index during the sample years 
1998-2004 should range from 3.39 to 5.74 percentage points (raising the Gini from around 
0.45 to 0.49-0.50). Atkinson, Piketty & Saez (2011) use tax data on top incomes to generate 
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similar US results, finding for 2006 a Gini 4.9 percentage points higher, at 0.519 as opposed 
to the original calculation of 0.470.1 Two main approaches have been pursued for 
international analyses of missing top incomes, and we discuss these in the following section.  
There is as yet no international analysis focusing specifically on untaxed income – and above 
all that which is deliberately hidden. Since the early 2000s, a growing ‘tax justice’ movement 
has highlighted the importance of undeclared assets and income streams held offshore, and of 
parallel patterns of profit-shifting by multinational companies (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2013). 
Various scholars (e.g. Zucman, 2013) have sought to uncover elements of the broader  
phenomenon that we may consider under the label of ‘illicit financial flows’.  
This paper considers how estimates of national inequality are different if adjusted for 
such flows. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on illicit 
financial flows and tax evasion in particular, including questions of definition and critically 
evaluating different estimation approaches. In section 3, we set out a range of approaches 
reflecting different inequality measures and different assumptions about the attribution of 
illicit incomes, and present our preliminary estimates. Section 4 concludes with discussion of 
the avenues of future research needed in order to improve such estimates. 
Our key finding on the basis of our preliminary estimates is that this particular aspect 
of hidden or uncounted income inequality may be of equivalent scale to that revealed by the 
inclusion of top incomes tax data. However, we note that current estimates of illicit flows are 
unlikely to offer the granularity or degree of confidence to construct robust adjusted series, 
and we therefore highlight a number of proposals for financial transparency measures that 
could support better adjustments.  
                                                          
1 The underlying World Top Incomes Project aims to track, through tax records, the incomes of the richest 10 
per cent, 5 per cent, 1 per cent, 0.1 per cent and 0.01 per cent and other fractiles in 30, largely but not entirely, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with available tax data (see 
Alvaredo et al., 2014). While the bulk of data currently available relate to higher income countries, work is 
underway to include additional developing countries. 
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2. ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
 
This section is divided into three parts. First, we consider the nature and definition of illicit 
financial flows (IFF), with a view to considering the reasonableness of attributing this to 
undeclared top incomes. Second, we discuss methodological issues and availability of the 
leading IFF estimates. Finally, we compare briefly the two main approaches taken in 
international work aiming to combine top incomes tax data with household survey data, as 
the basis for our own estimates in section 3.  
 
Illicit financial flows 
 
The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in 2015, include 
a global goal to curtail illicit financial flows. However, there is no agreed indicator. This 
reflects in part the relatively recent emergence of IFF as a major policy issue, and in part the 
difficulties of definition and of measurement.  
The definition of ‘illicit’ is broader than simple illegality, encompassing that which is 
forbidden by rules, law or custom.2 The defining feature of illicit financial flows (IFF) is 
therefore that they are hidden, rather than necessarily illegal, and where either the illicit 
origin of capital or the illicit nature of transactions undertaken is deliberately obscured. For 
example, aggressive corporate profit-shifting (often through the manipulation of transfer 
pricing) may well be legal (or at least, there may be a near-zero prospect of its being proved 
                                                          
2 This discussion draws on that in Cobham (2014); the definition of illicit is that of the Oxford English 
Dictionary.  
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to be illegal evasion by a tax authority with very limited capacity); but because the extent of 
the behaviour would be seen as in opposition to social expectations of paying a ‘fair share’ of 
tax, the activity may still be hidden through use of subsidiaries in more opaque jurisdictions.  
The most well-known classification of IFF stems from Baker (2005), who popularized the 
term, and disaggregates IFF into three elements: commercial tax evasion (estimated at up to 
two thirds of the total), the laundering of the proceeds of crime (up to a third), and corrupt 
payments and the theft of state assets (3-5% of the total). Table 1 provides a broader 
overview of the transaction types, which can be clustered into four main types by motivation 
(see final column): 1 - market/regulatory abuse, 2 - tax abuse, 3 - abuse of power, including 
the theft of state funds and assets, and 4 - proceeds of crime.  All four IFF types are likely to 
result in reductions in both state funds and institutional strength. The typology is unlikely to 
be comprehensive because there is potential to engineer an illicit flow in any transaction, and 
the range of potential illicit motivations is wide indeed; but nonetheless demonstrates the 
breadth of IFF phenomena.  
There is substantial overlap in the mechanisms used for IFF, regardless of motivation. 
The opportunity to hide, where it exists, is likely to be exploited for multiple purposes – so 
that identifying illicit flows in a particular mechanism will tend to be insufficient to specify 
the type of IFF in action. This raises two particular issues for research into income 
distributional impacts. First, IFFs include income that would not exist if all laws applied – 
namely the proceeds of crime, and the tax component of tax evading flows. Our concern here 
is not with the legal, or otherwise appropriate income distribution, but rather with the actual 
distribution, and so it is reasonable to allocate even illegal IFF income accordingly.  
The second issue is that a major type of IFF, that related to multinationals’ profit-
shifting, will in the great majority of cases accrue to people outside the particular country in 
question – and so should not be allocated to the national income distribution. Usefully, profit-
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shifting by multinationals is one area of IFFs where the estimation is largely separable – and 
so we are able to use estimates which (largely) reflect other IFFs. To the extent that full 
separation is impossible, however, note that this creates some risk of over-allocating income 
domestically in what follows. 
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Table 1: A typology of illicit financial flows 
 
Flow Manipulation Illicit motivation IFF type 
Exports Over-pricing Exploit subsidy regime 2 
  (Re)patriate undeclared capital 1 
 Under-pricing Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
  Shift criminal proceeds out 4 
  Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation) 1 
Imports Under-pricing Evade tariffs 2 
  (Re)patriate undeclared capital 1 
 Over-pricing Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
  Shift criminal proceeds out 4 
  Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation) 1 
  Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
Inward investment Under-pricing Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
  Shift criminal proceeds out 4 
  Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation) 1 
 Over-pricing (Re)patriate undeclared capital 1 
 Anonymity Hide market dominance 1 
 Anonymity Hide political involvement 3 
Outward investment Under-pricing Evade capital controls (including on profit repatriation) 1 
 Over-pricing Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
  Shift criminal proceeds out 4 
 Anonymity Hide political involvement 3 
Public lending  (If no expectation of repayment, or if under-priced) Public asset theft (illegitimate allocation of state funds) 3 
Public borrowing (If state illegitimate, or if over-priced) Public asset theft (illegitimate creation of state liabilities) 3 
Related party lending  Under-priced Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
Related party borrowing Over-priced Shift undeclared (licit) income/profit 2 
Public asset sales Under-pricing Public asset theft 3 
 Anonymity Hide market dominance  1 
 Anonymity Hide political involvement 3 
Public contracts Over-pricing Public asset theft 3 
 Anonymity Hide market dominance 1 
 Anonymity Hide political involvement 3 
Offshore ownership transfer Anonymity Corrupt payments  3 
Source: Cobham (2014). IFF type: 1 - market/regulatory abuse; 2 - tax abuse; 3 - abuse of power, including the theft of state funds and assets; 4 - proceeds of crime.
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Leading IFF estimates 
 
As noted, we do not here focus on multinational profit-shifting since the likely implications 
for national income distribution are limited. That literature (see e.g. Crivelli et al., 2015, and 
Cobham & Janský, 2015) is largely self-contained, drawing variously from data on 
multinationals’ balance sheets and/or survey and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) data to 
identify anomalies in the distribution of the international corporate tax base.  Most IFF 
approaches focus instead on anomalies in the capital account (unrecorded capital movements) 
and in the current account (via mispriced trade, which is assessed to be dominated by 
unrelated party transactions rather than multinationals’ intra-group profit shifting).   
For capital account anomalies, the two most commonly used methods are the World 
Bank Residual Method (WBR) and the Hot Money ‘Narrow’ Method (HMN). Both these 
methods rely on anomalies in the Balance of Payment (BoP) identity: 
A + B + C + D + E + F + G + H = 0 
Where:  
A: current account balance 
B: net equity flows (including net FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment) 
C: other short-term capital of other sectors 
D: Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) involving other bonds 
E: change in deposit-moneybanks’ foreign assets 
F: change in reserves of the central bank 
G: net errors and omissions (NEO) 
H: change in external debt 
The World Bank residual method (WBR) captures the difference between recorded inflows 
and recorded uses, which is given by the (negative) sum of the current account balance, net 
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equity flows, change in reserves of the central bank and change in external debt and by the 
Balance of Payments (BoP) identity:  
-(A + B + F + H) = C + D + E + G 
Of the components on the right-hand side, however, C+D+E are licit: composed of other 
short-term capital of other sectors, FPI involving other bonds, and the change in deposit-
money banks’ foreign assets. As such, the WBR method is likely to exhibit a substantial 
upwards bias as an estimator of IFF.  
The main alternative, the Hot Money ‘Narrow’ method (HMN), is given by the 
remaining right-hand side component, G: net errors and omissions. G is simply the balancing 
residual constructed to maintain the BoP identity, and so serves as an indicator of error – and 
possibly of illicitness – in the overall capital account. The most well-known estimates, 
produced by Global Financial Integrity, have shifted from using the WBR method (e.g. Kar 
& Cartwright-Smith, 2010) to the HMN (e.g. Kar & Freitas, 2011).  
The longest-standing series of estimates, although published for African countries 
only, are those of Ndikumana & Boyce (e.g. 2010). These authors also contrast sources and 
uses of foreign exchange in the capital account, but adjust for exchange rate fluctuations on 
the value of external debt, for debt writeoffs and for under-reported remittances (the latter on 
the basis of discrepancies between UN IFAD estimates and BoP data).  
Both Global Financial Integrity and Boyce & Ndikumana also include a trade-related 
IFF component as the second part of their flow estimates. While this may include some 
transfer mispricing by multinationals for the purpose of profit-shifting, trade misinvoicing is 
a more crude approach to tax reduction than those challenged in the OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting action plan, the major international attempt to curtail the activity. Instead, 
these anomalies are more likely to reveal unrelated party transactions that aim to shift part of 
one party’s income into a different jurisdiction.  
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In both approaches, the authors use national trade data to establish anomalies in the declared 
values of total exports and imports, on the basis that these reveal illicit shifts of value. On one 
view, these estimates are rather conservative. They pick up only one form of trade 
misinvoicing, which occurs via reinvoicing. The data does not pick up, for example, trade 
transactions where the misinvoicing is incorporated in the same invoice exchanged between 
exporter and importer. In addition their data does not pick up misinvoicing of services and 
intangibles.  
Within the same broad approach type are more detailed trade studies, such as those 
carried out by Pak and Zdanowicz (1994; 2005) and UNECA (2012), and these may suggest a 
need for some caution. Greater confidence is possible in estimates such as the latter which are 
based on more granular data – at detailed commodity level at least, and ideally at transaction 
level. The difficulties in obtaining consistent, high-quality data of this type mean that the 
leading global estimates at present rely instead on national-level data – and serious criticisms, 
including of the GFI approach, have been raised (Johannesen & Pirttilä, 2016; Hong & Pak, 
2016; Nitsch, 2016). An important difference in approach between Boyce & Ndikumana and 
GFI is that the former net off their estimates of illicit inflows, to obtain a more conservative 
(and also more volatile) series, while GFI argue that because there is no such thing as net 
crime it makes sense to consider gross outflows.  
While illicit inflows could be considered to counteract detrimental effects of illicit 
outflows by increasing available capital resources, this position is questionable (see UNECA 
(2012) and AUC-UNECA (2015) for a more detailed discussion) because the damage of IFF 
to governance may be more important than the net resource effect. The benefits to the 
economy of illicit financial inflows to the economy may well be less than those of licit 
inflows, since the illicit inflows may themselves be going to fund the illicit economy (e.g. 
repatriation of profits by transnational organized criminal organizations may be used to fund 
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expansion of activities in the country in question; the flows could also represent financing of 
terrorism); or be circumventing regulation or taxation designed to ensure fair competition. 
For our purposes in this paper, illicit financial inflows seem just as likely as illicit outflows to 
be distributed as or more unequally than funds in the licit economy, and so our primary 
interest is in estimates that do not 'net out' illicit financial inflows.  
Figure 1 shows a comparison for estimates of total African IFF, between GFI 
methodology with WBR and HMN – Kar & Cartwright-Smith (2010), and Kar & Freitas 
(2011), respectively – and the Ndikumana & Boyce approach. Note that differences between 
the series frequently exceed the total value of the lowest estimate. Ndikumana & Boyce 
demonstrates greater volatility, as would be expected given in particular their use of net 
rather than gross trade mispricing. At the aggregate level, GFI’s updated (HMN) 
methodology tends to produce the more conservative estimates.  
Figure 1: Comparison of illicit financial outflow estimates for Africa, US$ billion 
  
These differences provide an important illustration of the sensitivity of estimates to 
assumptions. Note, too, that these are shown at the aggregate level; disaggregated, there are 
examples of quite different country patterns over time. 
Ndikumana and Boyce have generally focused more on the stock of capital held 
outside African countries, than on the annual outflows. Similarly, Henry (2012) produces 
global estimates with a largely common methodology, scaling up from outflows to estimates 
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stocks of capital held offshore. The alternative approach here is to use data on international 
asset and liability positions in order to establish anomalies in the position of particular 
jurisdictions. Zucman (2013) follows this line of approach, focusing on a group of pre-
determined ‘tax haven’ jurisdictions and the potential undeclared wealth held there. Henry’s 
estimate, reflecting a wider set of asset types and without the limitation on jurisdictions 
holding assets, is unsurprisingly much larger: in the range of $21 trillion to $32 trillion, 
compared to around $8 trillion for Zucman.3 It is possible to estimate the income streams that 
may accrue on offshore assets.  
Both Henry (2012) and Zucman (2013) estimate an offshore income stream of around 
$190 billion annually (Henry assumes a much more cautious rate of his return, on his much 
higher estimated stock). When country-level estimates are available, this may provide an 
alternative source of hidden income data to include in national distribution analysis. 
However, the additional extrapolations (from outflows to stocks, and then to potential income 
streams) inevitably add a higher degree of uncertainty. For that reason, we focus here on 
estimated outflows only, treating these directly as hidden (domestic) income.  
We recognize that there are reasons to be cautious about the GFI estimates. In 
particular, further work is needed on the capital account component, to explore the 
implications of varying other assumptions and parameters than those in the WBR vs HMN 
comparison which has large effects on the results. In addition, it is clear that trade analyses 
based on more granular data are likely to yield more accurate findings, and this should be 
pursued.  
For the present analysis, however, in which we are primarily interested in considering 
the potential importance of the phenomenon in relation to national inequality – not, for 
                                                          
3 Piketty (2014) argues that Zucman’s estimate, implying that undeclared financial assets in tax havens may 
amount to nearly 10% of world GDP, may well be ‘a lower bound’ (p.466). 
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example, in tracking levels year on year – the GFI estimates are the most appropriate. Table 2 
below shows the share of illicit financial outflows (using GFI estimates) in developing 
countries’ GDP, sorted in descending order based on the share of illicit financial outflows in 
GDP for 2013 (the latest year for which estimates are available from GFI).  
For many countries, IFF can be well above the accounting threshold for materiality of 
5%. For some, often developing countries with smaller economies, that threshold is surpassed 
many times over. Some of the largest IFF in absolute value, however, relate to larger 
economies such as Argentina, China, Nigeria and South Africa where the intensity of IFF to 
GDP is lower.   
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Table 2: Estimated illicit outflow by country (leading countries only), % share of GDP 
 
Country 2013 Average 2004-13 Country 2013 Average 
2004-13 
 Nicaragua 45% 36% Mexico 6% 5% 
Costa Rica 43% 32% Haiti 6% 2% 
Togo 34% 73% Mali 6% 5% 
Honduras 30% 35% Bangladesh 6% 5% 
Djibouti 28% 38% Panama 6% 8% 
Liberia 28% 103% Russian 
Federation 
5% 7% 
Cambodia 26% 13% Hungary 5% 4% 
Equatorial Guinea 26% 15% Mauritania 5% 1% 
Vanuatu 25% 39% Nigeria 5% 6% 
Trinidad and Tobago 24% 17% Guatemala 5% 6% 
Azerbaijan 20% 24% South Africa 5% 7% 
Samoa 19% 26% Libya 5% 2% 
Suriname 17% 22% India 4% 4% 
Armenia 17% 11% Tunisia 4% 4% 
Belarus 15% 17% Croatia 4% 6% 
Malawi 15% 12% Fiji 4% 8% 
Solomon Islands 15% 21% Venezuela, 
Bol.Rep. 
4% 7% 
Malaysia 15% 19% Morocco 4% 5% 
Lao PDR 15% 10% D minican 
Republic 
4% 3% 
Comoros 15% 10% Bulgaria 4% 6% 
Paraguay 14% 26% Chile 4% 3% 
The Gambia 14% 11% Peru 3% 3% 
Rwanda 14% 7% Turkey 3% 2% 
Zambia 13% 19% Poland 3% 2% 
Moldova 13% 19% Papua New 
Guinea 
3% 4% 
Maldives 12% 5% Philippines 3% 6% 
Chad 12% 11% Argentina 3% 2% 
Lesotho 11% 19% China 3% 3% 
Oman 11% 8% Uruguay 3% 3% 
Guyana 11% 14% Cabo Verde 3% 3% 
Kazakhstan 11% 15% Sri Lanka 3% 5% 
Grenada 11% 7% Kuwait 3% 2% 
Vietnam 10% 9% Qatar 2% 5% 
Kiribati 10% 4% FYR 
Macedonia 
2% 6% 
Sao Tome and Principe 10% 8% Jamaica 2% 5% 
Jordan 10% 7% Ecuador 2% 5% 
Namibia 10% 14% Romania 2% 2% 
Burundi 9% 5% Guinea-
Bissau 
2% 8% 
Sierra Leone 8% 22% Niger 2% 3% 
Botswana 8% 12% Mad gascar 2% 8% 
Belize 8% 10% St. Lucia 2% 1% 
Thailand 8% 6% Mozambique 2% 2% 
Ukraine 8% 8% Indonesia 2% 3% 
El Salvador 8% 9% Barbados 2% 3% 
Mauritius 7% 7% Uganda 1% 4% 
Georgia 7% 16% Ghana 1% 1% 
Bolivia 7% 3% Egypt 1% 3% 
Guinea 7% 8% Brazil 1% 1% 
Ethiopia 7% 9% Mongolia 1% 2% 
Burkina Faso 7% 5% Cameroon 1% 4% 
Senegal 7% 7% Saudi Arabia 1% 1% 
Iraq 7% 7% Benin 1% 2% 
Republic of Congo 7% 19% Sudan 1% 2% 
Swaziland 6% 16% Timor-Leste 1% 0% 
Serbia 6% 12% Tanzania 1% 2% 
Côte d'Ivoire 6% 11% Algeria 0% 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Kar and Spanjers (2015) and International Monetary Fund (2016).  
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International adjustments to national income distributions 
 
Two main approaches have been taken in international work to adjust national distributions. 
That of Lakner & Milanovic (2013) is in part based on Banerjee & Piketty’s (2010) finding 
that the discrepancy between Indian national accounts and survey data can be somewhat 
explained by underreporting by top income earners. Lakner & Milanovic therefore allocate 
the gap between household final consumption in national accounts and household surveys 
(where the former is larger) to the top 10%, assuming a Pareto distribution. In effect, this 
assumes that national accounts are able to pick up total income more accurately than surveys 
which are subject to individual under-reporting, and that the great bulk of this can be 
attributed to the top decile. As the authors note, this “should be seen as an approximate first 
step, in the absence of a more careful analysis using unit-record data” (p.15). While Anand & 
Segal (2014) criticize the use of national account means in this way. The broad choice of 
allocating missing income to the top 10% although not ideal is useful as a method.  
The second approach is that of Anand and Segal (2014) themselves, who draw on the 
taxation data from the World Top Incomes Project, and assume that very rich households are 
simply excluded from surveys: 
[W]e assume that the survey data in the Milanovic dataset represent only the bottom 
99% of the population in each country. Accordingly we multiply the population in 
each income group in the surveys by 0.99, and append the top percentile with its 
income share from the tax data (assuming that its share of ‘control’ income is equal 
to its share of survey income).  
Data on top incomes is only available for 30 countries, of which Anand and Segal found that 
only 18 to 23 had applicable data for any individual year in their analysis. To extrapolate 
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other data Anand and Segal estimate a relationship between the share of the top 10% and the 
survey mean in the national survey distribution and that of the top 1% in the income tax data. 
The limitations of the Gini measure are evident in the results. The biggest change found 
occurs in 2005 and is 4 percentage points, whereas Theil’s T shows a dramatically greater 
equivalent change of 22 percentage points. As noted in Cobham & Sumner (2013), the Gini 
becomes increasingly unresponsive at higher levels of inequality, and this is well seen here. It 
is well known the Gini is over-responsive to changes in the middle relative to changes at the 
top and bottom of the distribution (Cowell, 2000; 2007). As a result, we provide estimates in 
the following section using both the Gini and the Palma (2011) ratio, which has been 
proposed as an alternative inequality measure that is both more sensitive to the extremes of 
the distribution and more responsive at higher levels of inequality (Cobham, Schlogl & 
Sumner, 2015). 
 
3. ADJUSTING NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION DATA FOR ILLICIT FINANCIAL 
FLOWS: APPROACH AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
It is inevitable that flow-to-stock approaches capture IFF that reflect activities other than tax-
evading or tax-avoiding incomes. However, it is reasonable on the basis of Table 1 to argue 
that all the hidden outflows reflect hidden incomes, be the motivation related to tax or 
criminality. In addition, the bulk of multinational company tax avoidance (the type which the 
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative seeks to address) are hard to detect by these 
approaches, so the probability of picking up foreign income in this way is relatively small.  
Nonetheless, many IFF transactions will involve at least some payment, or effective sharing 
of the illicit income offshore, so it may not make sense to take the entire estimate as national 
income. Finally, there remain broad concerns that estimation approaches based on anomalies 
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in what is inevitably imperfect data may include ‘false positives’ and so overstate the 
problem; along with some specific concerns about e.g. whether highly aggregated trade data 
will produce results consistent with those based on transaction-level analysis; or whether, for 
example, remittance data is well captured.  
For these reasons then, we consider a hypothetical case in which the main flow-to-
stock estimates of GFI are considered to represent illicit income, but where they are deflated 
arbitrarily by 50% to allow for the possibilities of overstatement of IFF, and of IFF 
representing foreign rather than home income. 
Having adjusted flows to 2005 dollars, we combine with similarly adjusted household 
final consumption expenditure from national accounts. Following Lakner and Milanovic 
(2013), we allocate the estimate of undeclared income to the top 10% in its entirety.4 We 
present estimates for the Gini, and for the Palma Ratio (see Palma 2011) which is simply the 
income share of the richest decile, divided by that of the poorest four deciles. All country 
level estimates are provided in the annex table A1. Table 3 below shows the summary 
statistics for the full sample and restricted sample (most recent). Table 4 shows the largest 
changes at country level by absolute change of the Gini (more than 2 points). The mean and 
median Gini are 0.41 in the full sample. Palma ratios from original survey data are 2.59 and 
2.09 respectively for the mean and median in the full sample. The adjustment for illicit flows 
adds 0.03 or 0.02 to the Gini to bring it to 0.44 (mean) and 0.43 (median).  
This is a not insignificant adjustment in the sense that it is approximately the same 
amount of absolute change as top incomes adjustment makes in the Anand and Segal (2014) 
                                                          
4 It may be thought unlikely that the entire domestic component of IFF income can be attributed to the top 10%. 
However, it seems a reasonable simplifying assumption in the case of tax-motivated flows, especially in lower-
income countries where direct taxation (be it of labour or investment income, or capital gains etc) tends to have 
a very narrow base. The likelihood of cross-border flows relating to the corruption of public officials seems 
small outside of high earners (i.e. those in a position of sufficient power to be worth a large bribe).   For the 
component of IFF relating to transnational organized crime, data are scarce but some survey research suggests 
that the gains tend to concentrate on those at the top of criminal organizations; for example, Collier (2007) cites 
research showing that people join criminal gangs not because they receive good starting pay, but because they 
will become immensely rich if they manage to reach the top of the organization. 
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estimates cited earlier. The adjustment adds 0.1 to the Palma Ratio on average taking it to 
3.07 (mean) and 2.42 (median). Again this is not an insignificant amount. Africa and East and 
Central Europe have the largest individual country adjustments, but beyond this no clear 
pattern dominates. The four largest adjustments, both relative and absolute, occur for Liberia 
and Chad (from Palma ratios below 2, to ratios near 2.5), and the more equal Belarus and 
Tajikistan (from around 1 to around 1.5).  
We also consider a case in which illicit financial flows accrue in their entirety to those 
receiving the top 1 % of income.5 In this case, the mean absolute difference in the Gini 
measure rises to 0.08 and the median difference rises to 0.06. This is now over double the 
absolute change in inequality that the top incomes adjustment makes in Anand and Segal 
(2014). Table 5 below presents the results of this exercise. 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
 Original survey With adjustment Absolute difference Relative difference 
 Palma Gini Palma Gini Palma Gini Palma Gini 
Full sample         
Mean 2.59 0.41 3.07 0.44 -0.55 -0.03 -24% -8% 
Median 2.09 0.41 2.42 0.43 -0.26 -0.02 -12% -5% 
Max 14.67 0.64 15.34 0.71 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 
Min 0.80 0.24 0.81 0.24 -10.36 -0.34 -612% -92% 
Obs 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
Restricted Sample         
Mean 2.32 0.40 2.83 0.43 -0.54 -0.03 -26% -8% 
Median 1.88 0.39 2.31 0.43 -0.21 -0.02 -11% -3% 
Max 7.05 0.61 12.05 0.71 0.00 0.00 0% 0% 
Min 0.80 0.24 0.81 0.24 -10.36 -0.34 -612% -93% 
Obs 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Source: Authors’ estimates. Absolute and relative differences are reported as negative values, i.e. they reflect the 
degree of potential understatement in income distribution data that does not adjust for illicit incomes. 
 
  
                                                          
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 4. Estimates of Palma Ratio and Gini, with and without IFF adjustment, selected countries with 
absolute change in Gini > 0.02 
 
  Original survey With adjustment Absolute difference Relative difference 
Country Year Palma Gini Palma Gini Palma Gini Palma Gini 
Albania 2008 1.44 0.33 1.48 0.34 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Belarus 2011 0.92 0.26 2.12 0.40 -1.20 -0.14 -1.30 -0.54 
Bhutan 2007 1.68 0.37 2.54 0.44 -0.86 -0.07 -0.51 -0.18 
Bulgaria 2007 1.00 0.28 1.24 0.31 -0.24 -0.03 -0.24 -0.12 
Burundi 2006 1.35 0.32 1.61 0.35 -0.26 -0.03 -0.20 -0.09 
Cameroon 2007 1.76 0.38 2.02 0.40 -0.25 -0.02 -0.14 -0.06 
Chad 2002 1.85 0.39 4.68 0.55 -2.83 -0.16 -1.53 -0.42 
Congo, Rep. 2005 2.76 0.46 4.16 0.53 -1.40 -0.07 -0.51 -0.15 
Costa Rica 2009 3.33 0.49 5.34 0.57 -2.01 -0.08 -0.60 -0.16 
Dominican Republic 2010 2.75 0.46 3.22 0.49 -0.48 -0.03 -0.17 -0.06 
Fiji 2008 2.17 0.41 2.61 0.45 -0.44 -0.03 -0.20 -0.08 
Gabon 2005 2.02 0.40 2.42 0.43 -0.40 -0.03 -0.20 -0.08 
Guinea 2007 1.80 0.38 2.41 0.43 -0.60 -0.05 -0.33 -0.12 
Honduras 2009 5.21 0.55 6.93 0.60 -1.73 -0.04 -0.33 -0.08 
Latvia 2009 1.42 0.34 1.80 0.38 -0.38 -0.04 -0.27 -0.11 
Lesotho 2002 3.87 0.51 5.69 0.57 -1.82 -0.06 -0.47 -0.12 
Liberia 2007 1.69 0.37 12.05 0.71 -10.36 -0.34 -6.12 -0.93 
Macedonia, FYR 2010 2.26 0.43 2.58 0.45 -0.32 -0.02 -0.14 -0.05 
Source: Authors’ estimates. Absolute and relative differences are reported as negative values, i.e. they reflect the 
degree of potential understatement in income distribution data that does not adjust for illicit incomes. 
 
Table 5: Adjustments for IFF, attributing all to top 1%, Gini  
 Original survey With adjustment Absolute difference Relative difference 
Full sample     
Mean 0.41 0.49 -0.08 -20% 
Median 0.41 0.49 -0.06 -15% 
Max 0.64 0.78 -0.02 -7% 
Min 0.24 0.26 -0.41 -112% 
Obs 252 252 252 252 
Restricted Sample     
Mean 0.40 0.49 -0.08 -22% 
Median 0.39 0.47 -0.07 -17% 
Max 0.61 0.78 -0.03 -8% 
Min 0.26 0.31 -0.41 -112% 
Obs 61 61 61 61 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is growing interest in extending income distribution data, typically based on household 
surveys, to allow for taxable income declarations of the highest earners. No attempt has been 
made thus far in allowing for undeclared taxable income, or more broadly for adjusting 
income distribution data to allow for illicit financial flows. Making such an adjustment, even 
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for countries with relatively robust survey and tax data, requires a number of contentious 
assumptions – though arguably less heroic than adjustment for top income – because tax data 
are lacking for many developing countries. The purpose is thus, as with top income 
adjustment, intended as illustrative rather than exacting. In short, it is possible to use existing 
illicit flow estimates in combination with survey distribution data, to consider the potential 
implications for - here national - income inequality across a wide range of countries.  
There are at least three major issues to be considered for any future work.  First, what IFF 
estimates are appropriate to use, and what proportion (e.g. 50% as here, or the entire 
estimate?). Second, to what part of the income distribution (e.g. top 10% or top 1%) should 
the adjustment be made? And third, what inequality measure/s are most appropriate to 
evaluate the adjustment? Our findings here are consistent in the central point. We use the 
most common IFF estimates but discount by 50%, consider both the Palma ratio and Gini 
inequality measures, and explore allocating illicit income to the top 10% and the top 1%. In 
every case, the adjustment to inequality is at least of a level with that found when adjusting 
for top incomes using tax data. The ‘uncounted’ inequality due to illicit financial flows is 
likely in many cases to be material, in an accounting sense, in relation to our understanding of 
national income distributions. Our central conclusion is therefore that there is an avenue of 
research, not least on the three questions above, in order to extend estimates of national 
income distributions in light of IFF. Finally, these suggestive findings point to the value of 
greater financial transparency in a number of areas: from continuing international cooperation 
by tax authorities with the World Top Incomes Tax Database to improve coverage (both 
geographic and across time), to better data to estimate (and indeed to curtail) IFF - redoubled 
international commitment to public registers of beneficial ownership, perhaps building 
towards the global financial registry that Zucman (2015) and Piketty (2014) propose, and a 
step change in the collection and open publication of bilateral data on the holdings of 
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international asset stocks that would underpin much closer estimates of undeclared overseas 
income streams. Finally, work on methodologies and estimates will be required for the UN 
Sustainable Development not only to generate a target but to track it.  
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Table A1: Estimates of Palma Ratio and Gini with and without adjustment for Illicit Financial Flows (full sample) 
 
  Original survey With adjustment Absolute difference Relative difference 
Country Year Palma Gini Palma Gini Palma Gini Palma Gini 
Albania 2005 1.301 0.162 1.333 0.164 -0.032 -0.002 -0.024 -0.011 
Albania 2008 1.436 0.167 1.476 0.169 -0.040 -0.002 -0.028 -0.013 
Bangladesh 2005 1.348 0.162 1.382 0.164 -0.034 -0.002 -0.025 -0.012 
Bangladesh 2010 1.272 0.156 1.347 0.161 -0.075 -0.005 -0.059 -0.029 
Belarus 2002 1.108 0.147 1.725 0.182 -0.616 -0.036 -0.556 -0.242 
Belarus 2004 0.908 0.129 1.538 0.170 -0.630 -0.041 -0.694 -0.321 
Belarus 2005 0.986 0.137 1.551 0.172 -0.565 -0.035 -0.573 -0.257 
Belarus 2006 1.025 0.141 1.710 0.181 -0.685 -0.041 -0.668 -0.289 
Belarus 2007 1.041 0.141 1.958 0.193 -0.917 -0.052 -0.881 -0.371 
Belarus 2008 0.955 0.133 2.081 0.198 -1.126 -0.065 -1.180 -0.488 
Belarus 2009 0.990 0.136 1.788 0.184 -0.798 -0.049 -0.806 -0.358 
Belarus 2010 0.982 0.136 1.653 0.177 -0.671 -0.041 -0.683 -0.305 
Belarus 2011 0.918 0.130 2.116 0.200 -1.198 -0.070 -1.305 -0.540 
Benin 2003 1.752 0.188 1.808 0.190 -0.056 -0.003 -0.032 -0.014 
Bhutan 2007 1.684 0.186 2.541 0.220 -0.856 -0.034 -0.508 -0.184 
Bolivia 2002 6.294 0.290 7.153 0.299 -0.859 -0.010 -0.137 -0.033 
Bolivia 2005 5.328 0.280 5.661 0.285 -0.333 -0.005 -0.062 -0.016 
Bolivia 2006 4.882 0.273 4.964 0.274 -0.082 -0.001 -0.017 -0.005 
Bolivia 2007 4.997 0.277 5.073 0.278 -0.076 -0.001 -0.015 -0.004 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 1.517 0.178 1.532 0.178 -0.014 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 
Brazil 2002 5.737 0.287 5.893 0.289 -0.157 -0.002 -0.027 -0.007 
Brazil 2003 5.587 0.284 5.782 0.287 -0.194 -0.003 -0.035 -0.009 
Brazil 2004 5.151 0.278 5.363 0.281 -0.212 -0.003 -0.041 -0.011 
Brazil 2005 4.986 0.277 5.152 0.279 -0.166 -0.003 -0.033 -0.009 
Brazil 2007 4.617 0.270 4.639 0.270 -0.021 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 
Brazil 2008 4.386 0.266 4.511 0.269 -0.126 -0.002 -0.029 -0.008 
Brazil 2009 4.302 0.264 4.425 0.266 -0.123 -0.002 -0.029 -0.009 
Bulgaria 2003 1.071 0.143 1.437 0.166 -0.366 -0.023 -0.342 -0.162 
Bulgaria 2007 0.997 0.138 1.241 0.154 -0.244 -0.016 -0.245 -0.116 
Burkina Faso 2003 1.844 0.192 1.933 0.196 -0.089 -0.004 -0.049 -0.021 
Burkina Faso 2009 1.859 0.193 2.078 0.202 -0.219 -0.009 -0.118 -0.049 
Burundi 2006 1.347 0.162 1.610 0.177 -0.263 -0.015 -0.195 -0.092 
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Cambodia 2004 2.062 0.202 2.336 0.213 -0.274 -0.011 -0.133 -0.054 
Cambodia 2007 2.332 0.214 2.355 0.215 -0.022 -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 
Cambodia 2008 1.691 0.184 1.708 0.184 -0.016 -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 
Cambodia 2009 1.543 0.175 1.546 0.175 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Cameroon 2007 1.763 0.190 2.016 0.201 -0.253 -0.011 -0.143 -0.057 
Central African Republic 2003 2.264 0.213 2.306 0.214 -0.042 -0.001 -0.019 -0.007 
Chad 2002 1.848 0.194 4.681 0.276 -2.832 -0.082 -1.533 -0.422 
Chile 2003 4.052 0.263 4.113 0.265 -0.061 -0.001 -0.015 -0.005 
Chile 2006 3.478 0.251 3.552 0.252 -0.074 -0.002 -0.021 -0.007 
Colombia 2004 5.295 0.281 5.411 0.283 -0.116 -0.002 -0.022 -0.006 
Colombia 2008 4.999 0.276 5.004 0.277 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Congo, Rep. 2005 2.765 0.230 4.163 0.265 -1.399 -0.035 -0.506 -0.151 
Costa Rica 2002 3.359 0.246 4.143 0.263 -0.784 -0.017 -0.233 -0.069 
Costa Rica 2003 3.195 0.242 4.318 0.266 -1.123 -0.024 -0.351 -0.100 
Costa Rica 2004 2.985 0.237 4.389 0.268 -1.404 -0.031 -0.470 -0.133 
Costa Rica 2005 2.773 0.232 4.201 0.266 -1.428 -0.034 -0.515 -0.147 
Costa Rica 2006 3.040 0.239 4.488 0.271 -1.448 -0.032 -0.476 -0.135 
Costa Rica 2007 3.039 0.239 4.311 0.268 -1.271 -0.029 -0.418 -0.123 
Costa Rica 2008 2.979 0.237 4.389 0.270 -1.410 -0.032 -0.473 -0.137 
Costa Rica 2009 3.333 0.247 5.344 0.286 -2.011 -0.039 -0.603 -0.159 
Croatia 2004 1.053 0.142 1.163 0.149 -0.110 -0.007 -0.105 -0.051 
Croatia 2008 1.356 0.164 1.506 0.172 -0.149 -0.008 -0.110 -0.051 
Dominican Republic 2002 3.256 0.243 3.377 0.246 -0.121 -0.003 -0.037 -0.012 
Dominican Republic 2003 3.561 0.252 4.020 0.262 -0.460 -0.010 -0.129 -0.040 
Dominican Republic 2004 3.553 0.251 3.779 0.256 -0.226 -0.005 -0.064 -0.020 
Dominican Republic 2005 3.405 0.248 3.471 0.249 -0.067 -0.002 -0.020 -0.006 
Dominican Republic 2006 3.532 0.251 3.661 0.254 -0.129 -0.003 -0.037 -0.012 
Dominican Republic 2007 2.984 0.236 3.025 0.237 -0.041 -0.001 -0.014 -0.005 
Dominican Republic 2008 3.019 0.237 3.133 0.240 -0.114 -0.003 -0.038 -0.013 
Dominican Republic 2009 2.998 0.237 3.418 0.248 -0.420 -0.011 -0.140 -0.046 
Dominican Republic 2010 2.746 0.230 3.224 0.243 -0.478 -0.013 -0.174 -0.057 
Ecuador 2005 4.099 0.262 4.309 0.266 -0.210 -0.004 -0.051 -0.015 
Ecuador 2008 3.273 0.245 3.850 0.259 -0.576 -0.013 -0.176 -0.054 
Ecuador 2009 3.102 0.240 3.117 0.240 -0.015 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 
El Salvador 2002 4.033 0.258 4.426 0.265 -0.393 -0.007 -0.097 -0.027 
El Salvador 2003 3.455 0.247 3.653 0.251 -0.198 -0.004 -0.057 -0.017 
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El Salvador 2004 3.076 0.239 3.252 0.243 -0.177 -0.004 -0.057 -0.018 
El Salvador 2005 3.354 0.245 3.637 0.251 -0.283 -0.006 -0.084 -0.026 
El Salvador 2006 2.597 0.224 2.790 0.230 -0.193 -0.006 -0.074 -0.026 
El Salvador 2007 2.702 0.228 2.906 0.234 -0.204 -0.006 -0.075 -0.026 
El Salvador 2008 2.661 0.227 2.828 0.232 -0.166 -0.005 -0.062 -0.021 
El Salvador 2009 2.951 0.235 3.165 0.241 -0.215 -0.006 -0.073 -0.024 
Fiji 2002 2.735 0.229 3.418 0.246 -0.683 -0.018 -0.250 -0.077 
Fiji 2008 2.170 0.207 2.608 0.223 -0.438 -0.016 -0.202 -0.077 
Gabon 2005 2.024 0.201 2.424 0.217 -0.400 -0.015 -0.198 -0.076 
Georgia 2002 1.902 0.197 2.154 0.207 -0.253 -0.010 -0.133 -0.051 
Georgia 2003 1.906 0.197 2.280 0.211 -0.374 -0.014 -0.196 -0.072 
Georgia 2005 1.979 0.200 2.262 0.211 -0.283 -0.011 -0.143 -0.053 
Georgia 2006 1.988 0.200 2.355 0.214 -0.367 -0.014 -0.185 -0.069 
Georgia 2007 1.806 0.192 1.991 0.200 -0.185 -0.008 -0.102 -0.040 
Georgia 2008 2.011 0.202 2.321 0.213 -0.310 -0.011 -0.154 -0.057 
Georgia 2009 2.052 0.203 2.255 0.211 -0.203 -0.007 -0.099 -0.037 
Georgia 2010 2.094 0.206 2.224 0.210 -0.130 -0.005 -0.062 -0.023 
Guinea 2003 1.899 0.195 2.272 0.210 -0.373 -0.015 -0.196 -0.078 
Guinea 2007 1.805 0.192 2.408 0.216 -0.603 -0.024 -0.334 -0.123 
Honduras 2002 6.005 0.285 8.778 0.313 -2.773 -0.028 -0.462 -0.099 
Honduras 2003 5.678 0.284 8.186 0.312 -2.508 -0.028 -0.442 -0.098 
Honduras 2004 5.582 0.283 8.115 0.311 -2.533 -0.028 -0.454 -0.101 
Honduras 2005 6.139 0.289 8.847 0.316 -2.708 -0.027 -0.441 -0.095 
Honduras 2006 5.354 0.279 7.784 0.307 -2.430 -0.029 -0.454 -0.103 
Honduras 2007 4.651 0.272 6.599 0.300 -1.948 -0.028 -0.419 -0.102 
Honduras 2008 6.919 0.295 9.246 0.317 -2.328 -0.021 -0.336 -0.072 
Honduras 2009 5.209 0.276 6.934 0.298 -1.725 -0.021 -0.331 -0.077 
Hungary 2004 1.121 0.147 1.202 0.152 -0.081 -0.005 -0.072 -0.035 
Hungary 2007 1.197 0.152 1.208 0.153 -0.012 -0.001 -0.010 -0.005 
India 2004 1.355 0.162 1.451 0.167 -0.097 -0.006 -0.071 -0.035 
India 2009 1.392 0.164 1.488 0.170 -0.096 -0.006 -0.069 -0.034 
Indonesia 2002 1.135 0.145 1.353 0.159 -0.218 -0.014 -0.192 -0.099 
Indonesia 2005 1.400 0.165 1.566 0.174 -0.166 -0.009 -0.119 -0.057 
Indonesia 2008 1.393 0.166 1.629 0.179 -0.236 -0.013 -0.169 -0.077 
Indonesia 2010 1.486 0.174 1.511 0.175 -0.025 -0.001 -0.017 -0.007 
Jamaica 2002 14.669 0.318 15.340 0.321 -0.672 -0.003 -0.046 -0.009 
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Jamaica 2002 14.669 0.235 3.086 0.239 -0.169 -0.005 -0.012 -0.020 
Jamaica 2004 2.503 0.221 2.687 0.227 -0.183 -0.006 -0.073 -0.027 
Jordan 2002 1.768 0.189 1.814 0.191 -0.046 -0.002 -0.026 -0.011 
Jordan 2006 1.676 0.183 1.720 0.185 -0.044 -0.002 -0.026 -0.012 
Kazakhstan 2003 1.344 0.166 1.476 0.173 -0.132 -0.007 -0.098 -0.043 
Kazakhstan 2004 1.247 0.158 1.349 0.164 -0.102 -0.006 -0.082 -0.038 
Kazakhstan 2006 1.176 0.150 1.377 0.163 -0.201 -0.012 -0.171 -0.083 
Kazakhstan 2007 1.178 0.151 1.333 0.161 -0.155 -0.010 -0.132 -0.064 
Kazakhstan 2008 1.092 0.143 1.329 0.159 -0.237 -0.015 -0.217 -0.108 
Kazakhstan 2009 1.066 0.142 1.101 0.145 -0.035 -0.002 -0.033 -0.017 
Kenya 2005 2.810 0.230 2.870 0.232 -0.060 -0.002 -0.021 -0.008 
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 1.209 0.155 1.254 0.158 -0.046 -0.003 -0.038 -0.018 
Kyrgyz Republic 2004 1.421 0.170 1.449 0.172 -0.028 -0.001 -0.020 -0.009 
Kyrgyz Republic 2007 1.352 0.163 1.626 0.179 -0.275 -0.015 -0.203 -0.094 
Kyrgyz Republic 2009 1.525 0.177 1.592 0.180 -0.066 -0.003 -0.044 -0.018 
Kyrgyz Republic 2010 1.555 0.178 1.589 0.180 -0.034 -0.002 -0.022 -0.009 
Kyrgyz Republic 2011 1.327 0.163 1.494 0.172 -0.168 -0.009 -0.126 -0.057 
Latvia 2007 1.533 0.177 2.040 0.200 -0.507 -0.023 -0.331 -0.130 
Latvia 2008 1.561 0.179 2.035 0.200 -0.474 -0.021 -0.304 -0.119 
Latvia 2009 1.417 0.170 1.795 0.189 -0.378 -0.019 -0.267 -0.109 
Lesotho 2002 3.870 0.256 5.686 0.286 -1.816 -0.030 -0.469 -0.119 
Liberia 2007 1.692 0.185 12.055 0.357 -10.363 -0.172 -6.125 -0.928 
Macedonia, FYR 2002 1.745 0.189 1.904 0.196 -0.160 -0.007 -0.092 -0.036 
Macedonia, FYR 2003 1.766 0.190 1.971 0.199 -0.205 -0.009 -0.116 -0.045 
Macedonia, FYR 2004 1.748 0.189 1.990 0.200 -0.243 -0.010 -0.139 -0.054 
Macedonia, FYR 2005 1.771 0.192 2.078 0.204 -0.308 -0.012 -0.174 -0.064 
Macedonia, FYR 2006 2.173 0.209 2.371 0.216 -0.198 -0.007 -0.091 -0.033 
Macedonia, FYR 2008 2.339 0.215 2.834 0.231 -0.495 -0.016 -0.212 -0.074 
Macedonia, FYR 2009 2.216 0.211 2.507 0.221 -0.291 -0.010 -0.131 -0.046 
Macedonia, FYR 2010 2.261 0.213 2.579 0.224 -0.318 -0.010 -0.140 -0.048 
Madagascar 2005 2.642 0.223 2.925 0.232 -0.283 -0.010 -0.107 -0.043 
Madagascar 2010 2.329 0.214 2.381 0.216 -0.052 -0.002 -0.022 -0.008 
Malawi 2004 1.790 0.189 1.984 0.198 -0.194 -0.009 -0.108 -0.046 
Malawi 2010 2.301 0.213 2.679 0.226 -0.378 -0.013 -0.165 -0.060 
Malaysia 2004 1.666 0.186 2.952 0.234 -1.286 -0.048 -0.772 -0.259 
Malaysia 2007 2.592 0.225 4.208 0.265 -1.616 -0.040 -0.623 -0.179 
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Malaysia 2009 2.627 0.226 4.036 0.261 -1.410 -0.035 -0.537 -0.156 
Maldives 2004 1.612 0.183 2.003 0.200 -0.391 -0.017 -0.243 -0.093 
Mali 2006 1.777 0.190 1.940 0.197 -0.163 -0.007 -0.092 -0.037 
Mali 2010 1.294 0.162 1.720 0.185 -0.426 -0.023 -0.329 -0.139 
Mexico 2002 3.533 0.251 3.824 0.257 -0.291 -0.006 -0.082 -0.026 
Mexico 2002 3.533 0.247 3.411 0.254 -0.266 -0.007 -0.075 -0.030 
Mexico 2004 3.361 0.247 3.674 0.255 -0.313 -0.008 -0.093 -0.032 
Mexico 2004 3.361 0.242 2.873 0.249 -0.273 -0.008 -0.081 -0.033 
Mexico 2005 3.417 0.244 3.759 0.254 -0.342 -0.010 -0.100 -0.040 
Mexico 2006 3.161 0.232 3.477 0.240 -0.316 -0.009 -0.100 -0.038 
Mexico 2006 3.161 0.240 3.171 0.247 -0.295 -0.007 -0.093 -0.028 
Mexico 2008 3.290 0.223 3.705 0.231 -0.416 -0.008 -0.126 -0.037 
Mexico 2008 3.290 0.233 3.264 0.241 -0.373 -0.008 -0.113 -0.035 
Mexico 2010 2.812 0.233 3.130 0.243 -0.318 -0.010 -0.113 -0.044 
Mexico 2010 2.812 0.228 3.041 0.237 -0.307 -0.009 -0.109 -0.039 
Montenegro 2005 1.117 0.148 2.396 0.213 -1.279 -0.065 -1.146 -0.441 
Montenegro 2006 1.064 0.144 1.545 0.173 -0.482 -0.029 -0.453 -0.201 
Montenegro 2007 1.145 0.151 1.710 0.182 -0.565 -0.032 -0.493 -0.209 
Montenegro 2008 1.115 0.147 1.388 0.164 -0.273 -0.017 -0.245 -0.115 
Montenegro 2009 1.132 0.148 1.330 0.160 -0.198 -0.012 -0.175 -0.083 
Montenegro 2010 1.020 0.140 1.208 0.152 -0.188 -0.012 -0.184 -0.088 
Mozambique 2002 2.679 0.226 2.895 0.233 -0.215 -0.007 -0.080 -0.030 
Namibia 2003 6.693 0.304 6.843 0.306 -0.149 -0.002 -0.022 -0.006 
Nepal 2003 2.272 0.211 2.463 0.218 -0.191 -0.007 -0.084 -0.034 
Nepal 2010 1.298 0.160 1.697 0.182 -0.399 -0.022 -0.307 -0.136 
Nicaragua 2005 3.655 0.252 4.734 0.274 -1.079 -0.022 -0.295 -0.086 
Nicaragua 2005 3.655 0.197 2.670 0.225 -0.753 -0.028 -0.206 -0.141 
Nigeria 2009 3.015 0.237 3.884 0.258 -0.869 -0.021 -0.288 -0.089 
Nigeria 2011 1.840 0.194 2.006 0.201 -0.165 -0.007 -0.090 -0.035 
Pakistan 2005 1.321 0.158 1.327 0.159 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
Panama 2003 4.835 0.273 6.338 0.294 -1.502 -0.021 -0.311 -0.076 
Panama 2004 4.494 0.267 5.966 0.289 -1.472 -0.022 -0.328 -0.082 
Panama 2005 4.199 0.263 6.187 0.293 -1.988 -0.030 -0.473 -0.115 
Panama 2006 4.465 0.267 6.843 0.300 -2.378 -0.033 -0.533 -0.124 
Panama 2009 3.615 0.252 5.722 0.290 -2.107 -0.038 -0.583 -0.149 
Panama 2010 3.627 0.252 5.197 0.281 -1.570 -0.029 -0.433 -0.116 
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Paraguay 2002 4.886 0.273 6.279 0.293 -1.393 -0.020 -0.285 -0.072 
Paraguay 2003 4.751 0.274 6.916 0.304 -2.165 -0.030 -0.456 -0.110 
Paraguay 2004 3.970 0.260 5.809 0.291 -1.839 -0.032 -0.463 -0.121 
Paraguay 2005 3.658 0.253 5.787 0.291 -2.130 -0.038 -0.582 -0.149 
Paraguay 2006 4.255 0.264 6.594 0.300 -2.340 -0.036 -0.550 -0.136 
Paraguay 2007 3.816 0.256 5.793 0.291 -1.976 -0.035 -0.518 -0.135 
Paraguay 2008 3.574 0.251 5.533 0.287 -1.959 -0.036 -0.548 -0.145 
Paraguay 2009 3.441 0.247 5.480 0.285 -2.039 -0.038 -0.593 -0.154 
Paraguay 2010 3.730 0.253 6.150 0.294 -2.419 -0.042 -0.649 -0.164 
Peru 2006 3.416 0.247 3.447 0.248 -0.031 -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 
Peru 2007 3.609 0.251 3.619 0.251 -0.010 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
Peru 2008 3.086 0.238 3.093 0.238 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Peru 2009 3.099 0.239 3.131 0.239 -0.032 -0.001 -0.010 -0.003 
Philippines 2003 2.370 0.217 2.778 0.230 -0.408 -0.013 -0.172 -0.060 
Philippines 2006 2.309 0.215 2.682 0.227 -0.373 -0.012 -0.161 -0.057 
Philippines 2009 2.183 0.210 2.338 0.215 -0.155 -0.006 -0.071 -0.027 
Poland 2002 1.373 0.167 1.390 0.167 -0.018 -0.001 -0.013 -0.006 
Poland 2005 1.429 0.170 1.439 0.171 -0.010 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
Poland 2007 1.373 0.166 1.407 0.168 -0.034 -0.002 -0.025 -0.011 
Poland 2008 1.389 0.167 1.492 0.173 -0.104 -0.006 -0.075 -0.034 
Poland 2009 1.378 0.166 1.482 0.172 -0.104 -0.006 -0.076 -0.034 
Poland 2010 1.352 0.165 1.454 0.171 -0.101 -0.006 -0.075 -0.034 
Poland 2011 1.282 0.160 1.363 0.165 -0.081 -0.005 -0.063 -0.029 
Romania 2002 1.186 0.154 1.245 0.157 -0.059 -0.004 -0.050 -0.023 
Romania 2003 1.165 0.152 1.180 0.153 -0.016 -0.001 -0.014 -0.007 
Romania 2007 1.245 0.157 1.274 0.159 -0.029 -0.002 -0.024 -0.011 
Romania 2008 1.171 0.152 1.211 0.155 -0.041 -0.003 -0.035 -0.016 
Romania 2010 0.802 0.119 0.805 0.119 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
Russian Federation 2002 1.479 0.175 1.848 0.192 -0.369 -0.017 -0.250 -0.099 
Russian Federation 2003 1.614 0.182 2.103 0.204 -0.489 -0.021 -0.303 -0.117 
Russian Federation 2004 1.598 0.182 2.014 0.200 -0.417 -0.018 -0.261 -0.101 
Russian Federation 2005 1.634 0.184 2.042 0.201 -0.409 -0.018 -0.250 -0.097 
Russian Federation 2006 2.094 0.205 2.546 0.221 -0.452 -0.016 -0.216 -0.078 
Russian Federation 2007 2.277 0.212 2.722 0.227 -0.445 -0.015 -0.196 -0.071 
Russian Federation 2008 2.110 0.205 2.545 0.221 -0.435 -0.016 -0.206 -0.077 
Russian Federation 2009 1.885 0.195 2.502 0.219 -0.618 -0.024 -0.328 -0.123 
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Rwanda 2005 3.621 0.253 3.754 0.257 -0.133 -0.003 -0.037 -0.013 
Rwanda 2010 3.216 0.243 3.598 0.253 -0.382 -0.010 -0.119 -0.042 
Senegal 2005 1.791 0.191 1.792 0.191 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Serbia 2002 1.285 0.159 2.219 0.206 -0.934 -0.047 -0.727 -0.292 
Serbia 2003 1.290 0.160 2.343 0.211 -1.053 -0.051 -0.816 -0.317 
Serbia 2004 1.295 0.161 2.529 0.219 -1.235 -0.057 -0.953 -0.355 
Serbia 2005 1.321 0.163 2.114 0.202 -0.793 -0.039 -0.600 -0.238 
Serbia 2006 1.087 0.145 1.635 0.178 -0.548 -0.032 -0.504 -0.223 
Serbia 2007 1.077 0.144 1.404 0.164 -0.327 -0.020 -0.303 -0.141 
Serbia 2008 1.012 0.138 1.025 0.139 -0.014 -0.001 -0.014 -0.007 
Serbia 2009 0.984 0.137 1.401 0.163 -0.416 -0.027 -0.423 -0.197 
Serbia 2010 1.081 0.145 1.307 0.160 -0.226 -0.014 -0.209 -0.098 
Sierra Leone 2003 2.133 0.207 2.344 0.215 -0.211 -0.008 -0.099 -0.038 
Sierra Leone 2011 1.484 0.172 1.728 0.185 -0.244 -0.013 -0.164 -0.073 
South Africa 2008 7.052 0.306 7.907 0.314 -0.855 -0.009 -0.121 -0.028 
Sri Lanka 2006 1.905 0.195 1.921 0.196 -0.016 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 
Sudan 2009 1.447 0.173 1.745 0.187 -0.297 -0.014 -0.205 -0.083 
Swaziland 2009 3.513 0.250 3.600 0.252 -0.087 -0.002 -0.025 -0.008 
Syrian Arab Republic 2004 1.514 0.174 1.954 0.196 -0.440 -0.021 -0.291 -0.123 
Tajikistan 2003 1.272 0.160 1.543 0.175 -0.271 -0.015 -0.213 -0.094 
Tajikistan 2004 1.344 0.164 1.628 0.180 -0.284 -0.015 -0.211 -0.093 
Tajikistan 2007 1.259 0.159 1.540 0.175 -0.281 -0.016 -0.224 -0.099 
Tajikistan 2009 1.155 0.151 2.012 0.197 -0.857 -0.046 -0.742 -0.302 
Tunisia 2005 2.021 0.202 2.025 0.202 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Turkey 2002 2.163 0.207 2.176 0.208 -0.014 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 
Turkey 2006 1.902 0.197 1.904 0.197 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Uganda 2002 2.513 0.220 2.583 0.223 -0.070 -0.002 -0.028 -0.011 
Uganda 2005 2.148 0.207 2.472 0.219 -0.323 -0.012 -0.151 -0.057 
Uganda 2009 2.332 0.214 2.756 0.228 -0.424 -0.015 -0.182 -0.068 
Ukraine 2002 1.016 0.139 1.090 0.144 -0.074 -0.005 -0.073 -0.037 
Ukraine 2003 1.012 0.137 1.072 0.142 -0.060 -0.004 -0.059 -0.030 
Ukraine 2007 1.091 0.145 1.104 0.146 -0.013 -0.001 -0.012 -0.006 
Uruguay 2006 2.755 0.230 2.797 0.231 -0.042 -0.001 -0.015 -0.005 
Uruguay 2007 2.819 0.232 3.012 0.237 -0.192 -0.005 -0.068 -0.023 
Uruguay 2010 2.470 0.221 2.719 0.229 -0.249 -0.008 -0.101 -0.035 
Vietnam 2002 1.654 0.183 1.764 0.188 -0.109 -0.005 -0.066 -0.029 
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Vietnam 2004 1.585 0.180 1.662 0.184 -0.077 -0.004 -0.049 -0.021 
Vietnam 2008 1.489 0.174 1.538 0.176 -0.048 -0.003 -0.032 -0.014 
Zambia 2010 4.768 0.276 4.769 0.276 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
